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Abstract
Free healthcare obviously works when a partner from abroad supplies a health centre or a health district with
medicines and funding on a regular basis, provides medical, administrative and managerial training, and gives
incentive bonuses and daily subsistence allowances to staff. The experiments by three international NGO in Burkina
Faso, Mali and Niger have all been success stories. But withdrawing NGO support means that health centres that
have enjoyed a time of plenty under NGO management will return to the fold of health centres run by the state
in its present condition and the health system in its present condition, with the everyday consequences of late
reimbursements and stock shortages. The local support given by international NGOs has more often than not an
effect of triggering an addiction to aid instead of inducing local sustainability without infusion. In the same way,
scaling up to the entire country a local pilot experiment conducted under an NGO involves its insertion into a
national bureaucratic machine with its multiple levels, all of which are potential bottlenecks. Only experiments
carried out under the “ordinary” management of the state are capable of laying bare the problems associated with
this process. Without reformers ‘on the inside’ (within the health system itself and among health workers), no real
reform of the health system induced by reformers ‘from the outside’ can succeed.
The problems relating to the sustainability of public policies in Africa, especially when the policies benefit from
development aid, in the area of health among others, are familiar to researchers and policy-makers. However, as far
as user fee exemptions are concerned, debates about these problems have extended well beyond the narrow
circle of experts and into the public domain in the countries concerned. Throughout our research, we have
observed that the sustainability of free healthcare policies is a major concern of all the actors (health workers,
users, managers and senior administrative staff), and an issue that has generated widespread scepticism, especially
in Mali and Niger [1,2]. There is general unease about the state’s ability to reimburse health centres and to provide
essential inputs. The scepticism is fuelled by a two-fold negative experience: decades of incoherent public policies
at national level, plagued by bad management and uncertain funding, on the one hand; and the endless U-turns
by donors, the double binds of frequent contradictions in their funding policies and the short-term nature of the
programmes they enact, on the other [3].
The first years of exemption policies, which were beset by late reimbursements and more or less chronic stock
shortages, only added to the scepticism. The disquiet appears to be justified: despite their positive impact in terms
of health centre attendance, without funding guaranteed over time, efficient management, secure supply channels
and motivated staff, free healthcare policies fall foul of a host of adverse effects at every level of the health
pyramid.
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A two-tier service of free care: one NGO-funded,
the other state-funded
However, at local level, some health centres have been
shielded from these negative effects. These are, in the
main, health centres that enjoy technical and financial
support from external agencies (international institu-
tions and American or European NGOs).
Free healthcare obviously works when a partner from
abroad supplies a health centre or a health district with
medicines and funding on a regular basis, provides medi-
cal, administrative and managerial training, and gives
incentive bonuses and daily subsistence allowances to
staff [4-10]. The experiments by Terre des Hommes in
Burkina Faso, Médecins Sans Frontières-Belgium in Mali
and Médecins du Monde in Niger have all been success
stories, a fact that is well-publicized in their promotional
literature [11-13]. They prove not only that free health-
care leads to a higher level of attendance at health centres
once the financial barrier has been removed, which is
hardly surprising, but also that there is not necessarily a
decline in quality, indeed, it may even improve, if steps
are taken at the same time to provide additional funding,
support and quality control, and to motivate staff.
However, not far from these pockets of operational effi-
ciency, the other, state-run health centres, which are
totally deprived of such infusions of aid, are hit hard by
the consequences of late reimbursements and stock
shortages. Furthermore, their staff, who are paid less,
poorly trained, demotivated and subjected to the state’s
deplorable management of human resources, show little
sense of purpose in the face of a free service, in which
they have no faith. In Mali, for example, according to a
survey of perceptions conducted among 579 individuals
(health workers and users, in particular): “Stakeholders
remained sceptical about the State’s ability to provide
free treatment, which represents a real financial challenge
and presupposes a capacity for organization and control
which they feel the State does not have” [1]. Moreover,
for the majority of respondents: “The idea of free health-
care is associated with a loss of quality, in terms of both
relations with staff and the effectiveness of treatment“ [1].
Seen in this light, free healthcare policies in Burkina
Faso, Mali and Niger have created new inequalities: on
one side of the fence, there are privileged health centres,
supported by international NGOs, which are able to
apply fee exemptions efficiently without compromising
quality and have staff who are better paid and better
trained; on the other side, there are the majority of health
centres, struggling to survive in a destitute context, with
no infusions of aid, and in which fee exemptions only
aggravate problems, take away some of the formal and
informal resources from staff and threaten the supply of
inputs. There is a wide gulf between ‘NGO-funded’
health centres and ‘state-funded’ ones. The relative pros-
perity of the former feeds the bitterness of the latter.
This is of course the result of a complex historical pro-
cess mixing the difficulties of state building in former
colonies, the extraverted characteristics of development
policies [14], and the new public management techniques
of neo-liberal ideologies [15]. The end product is a new
form of “rentier state” [16], in which aid dependency is a
core feature, and where the delivery of public goods
by the state is deeply unsatisfactory in the view of most
citizens [3].
The two levels of sustainability
The infusions of NGO aid are, however, normally tem-
porary, and the health centres supported by it are des-
tined to re-enter the mainstream. In other words, the
problem of sustainability also arises in their case at local
level. Local sustainability exists alongside national
sustainability. These two processes are often confused,
and many NGOs try to do two things at once: the local
support an NGO gives to a health centre or district is
often presented as a ‘pilot experiment’, indicating by this
designation that it is intended, where possible, to lead to
the creation of a permanent public policy through a pro-
cess of scaling up. Most international NGOs operating in
the area of health that support a health centre have no
intention of setting up in a particular locality for any
length of time, thus they make it clear that their mission
is a temporary one and that their objective is to withdraw
once they have created the conditions for the continua-
tion of the activities they have introduced there. But is it
simply a matter of continuing with the experiment on
the same scale, in the same locality (a severing of links at
local level), or of extending it to the health system as a
whole (scaling it up to the national level)? Whether it
should be the country’s health authorities who benefit
from the results achieved at local level or whether owner-
ship by the district management teams is a viable option
is never properly discussed at any length by the interna-
tional NGOs and the ministry of health, either before the
former start their operations or after they wind them up.
In the case of free healthcare, a distinction can be
made, both operationally and analytically, between local
and national sustainability. This will be our approach
here. The three case studies that have been conducted
by our research team all bear witness to both the aims
and difficulties associated with these two forms of
sustainability.
The three cases
One case has been chosen in each of the three countries
where our team has investigated the removal of user
fees. The three NGOs were pro-gratuity organizations,
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locally appreciated and well-known, working at the dis-
trict level in coordination with the local and national
health authorities. Production of data has followed clas-
sical fieldwork techniques: immersion in the local
setting, knowledge of local languages, case studies,
in-depth observations, open interviews with different
strategic groups (frontline health personnel, NGO staff,
district officers, patients, management committees, com-
munity agents, chiefs, mayors, etc.). While most NGOs
and international agencies are interested primarily in
quantitative inquiries about outputs and outcomes, the
comparative advantages of qualitative methods, “opening
the black box” [17,18] of the implementation process,
are described in other papers of this issue (Olivier de
Sardan; Ridde & Olivier de Sardan).
We present here a transversal analysis, emanating
from the detailed case studies done by Diarra [19], Koné
[20], Yaogo & Zerbo [21]. Methodological details are
provided in these studies.
In Burkina Faso, the NGO Terre des Hommes (TDH)
became involved in the health district of Tougan from
2008 onwards; using funding from the European Union
(ECHO) it provided support in the area of mother and
child health and infant malnutrition [22]. It introduced
user fee exemptions for pregnant women and children
under five and the free management of malnutrition
among the under-fives, and appointed community actors
to educate people in health matters and to distribute
inputs. It also bore the entire sum charged to the women
for normal and dystocic deliveries (that is to say the bal-
ance of 20% chargeable to the patient after deduction of
the 80% state subsidy) on the basis of a third-party pay-
ment system (reimbursement being made to health cen-
tres) [21]. TDH still has an active role today, however it
is no longer involved in the current management of fee
exemptions but is only concerned with the job of moni-
toring, including quality control.
In the district of Kangaba in Mali, as part of a six-year
programme, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)-Belgium
pre-empted official policy in granting free anti-malarial
drugs (ACTs) and rapid diagnostic tests (RDTs) for chil-
dren under five and pregnant women (not only that, but
the NGO vigorously campaigned in favour of this pol-
icy). It then widened the scope of official exemptions by
abolishing all consultation and treatment charges for
children, irrespective of the nature of the illness. It
introduced a modest flat rate of XOF 200 (USD $0.4)
for all other users. In villages that were more than five
kilometres from a community health centre (CSCOM),
it trained community agents, referred to as ‘malaria
agents’, in the use of RDTs and the free distribution of
ACTs to those who tested positive. It also trained the
members of health committees (ASACO) so that they
could conduct awareness-raising sessions with local
populations [20].
In Niger, it was the NGO Médecins du Monde
(MDM)-France that provided input in the district of
Keita from 2006 to 2011. It introduced, and retained
until March 2007, user fee exemptions for pregnant
women and children under five - a decision that had
been taken by the state but was still to be implemented
at a national level - and subsequently supported this pol-
icy by compensating for the state’s shortcomings, espe-
cially in terms of reimbursements, and by providing
technical support. From April 2009, the NGO conducted
a unique experiment in Niger by exempting childbirth
from payment using the system of third-party payment,
but also with a pre-funding arrangement and the supply
of medical kits [20].
Local support and small-scale sustainability
In all three cases, the NGOs involved had clearly adopted
a strategy aimed at establishing a permanent local struc-
ture. In particular, they took great care to collaborate clo-
sely with the key operational body at this level, i.e. the
district supervisory team. In this case, therefore, there
was no question of NGOs working ‘in a vacuum’, an
approach that is only too familiar in traditional humani-
tarian medical aid and is regularly encountered in various
areas of development, including health. What one sees
here is the very opposite: i.e. a strategy that provides ‘sup-
port’ and involves ongoing cooperation with the
instances that make up the institutional fabric of health:
namely, management committees and other community
organizations, local health centres, line managers, and
the Ministry of Health (this is also true of the support
provided by the NGO Help in Dori [23]). While each
NGO has of course its own identity and organisational
culture (Cf. for instance for MSF [24]), there is a striking
convergence of their strategies in the three case studies,
concerning their relations with the health system and
their support to user fees removal.
This support is therefore intended to be temporary
and to prepare for the time when it is no longer avail-
able, in other words, when responsibility for the routine
management of the health system is handed back. But
there’s the rub: for, looking at it from another angle, the
health system as it currently exists at present in the
three countries in question is incapable of really taking
over at the local level (and even less so nationally). To
be more precise, withdrawing NGO support means that
health centres that have enjoyed an all too brief time of
plenty under NGO management will return to the fold
of health centres run by the state. In real terms, this will
entail a decline in the quality of healthcare, for both
financial reasons (the loss of the extra money provided
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by the NGO) and human reasons (the loss of training
that came with it and the demotivation of staff).
The problem is a relatively simple one: Given the pre-
sent state of the health systems in Burkina Faso, Mali
and Niger, how can state-run health centres, without
any resources or training other than those provided by
the state in its present condition and the health system
in its present condition, carry out the same activities as
those previously made possible by the involvement of
the international NGOs with their human and material
resources?
In the case of TDH in Tougan, the system of perfor-
mance-based-financing (PBF) has been one of the
important elements in the NGO’s involvement locally
and remains so to this day. The system entails a sub-
stantial financial contribution (in other words, an
on-going subsidy from the NGO) and close supervision
to ensure that the mechanisms for distributing and
overseeing these bonuses run smoothly (management,
book-keeping, quality indices, quarterly appraisals and
retrocession fees to management boards - COGES).
How could the Burkina health system on its own possi-
bly take over at the national level? A financial projection
shows that extending these bonuses to the whole coun-
try (just for the under-fives) would add between XOF 9
and 12 billion to the state’s annual budget [25]. Admit-
tedly, the current policy of the World Bank is aimed at
generalizing this kind of incentive scheme in Africa by
allocating significant funding to it (currently they
“experiment” with PBF at the level of 12 districts). How-
ever, neither the State nor even the World Bank will
provide the training and supervision at national level
that the TDH provided at district level, and one might
well be puzzled by a policy that takes no account of the
real state of the health system or of the ‘practical norms’
of its workers [26,27]. One can only applaud this warn-
ing: “In-depth country-level research may be considered
an essential precondition for the introduction of incentive
schemes,” [28].
In Mali, the NGO MSF-Belgium in Kangaba provided
finance for a number of types of expenditure: the wages
of the employees of the community health centre
(CSCOM); incentive bonuses for a range of other staff;
running costs; the Community Health Association’s
(ASACO) share of funding for evacuation and referral
cases; the wages of ‘malaria agents’. It paid XOF 1,000
to the CSCOM for every consultation given and XOF
10,000 to the Referral Health Centre (CSREF) for every
child hospitalized with a fever. In addition to its expatri-
ate staff, an administrator and a manager were
appointed. It carried out frequent and thorough supervi-
sions and inspections. None of this can be reproduced
by Mali’s state health system, at least not as things
stand at present.
When MSF-B withdrew, three strategies were imple-
mented for the continuation of its work at the local
level, however they have all failed:
- The provision of the Community Health Centre
(CSCOM) with sufficient working capital for three
months in the form of cash and medicines. However,
this reserve soon ran out and could in no way secure
the long-term viability of the services provided.
- The extraction of a commitment from the munici-
palities and the cercle (second level administrative
unit) to devote ten percent of their budget to health
and fund evacuation and referral entirely. This com-
mitment, which was negotiated by the MSF-B, has
not been honoured by the local politicians.
- The quest for other partners, in other words, for a
new source of funding, to take over from the MSF-
B. This attempt has not been successful.
In fact, faced with the steady collapse of the facilities it
had put in place (and a decline in the number of visits),
the MSF-B took the decision to extend its infusions of
aid, however through a new structure:
- The creation of a local association, the Medical Alli-
ance against Malaria (AMCP), which brought
together Malian health workers previously employed
by MSF-B and received European aid via MSF-B;
what is involved here, therefore, is the first-level
‘Malianization’ of foreign involvement with a national
NGO now acting as a local sub-contractor for an
international NGO that finds the funding (in fact,
because of security problems in the Sahel, which have
resulted in the departure of many European expatri-
ates, international NGOs have embarked on a similar
course of ‘nationalizing’ their activities by turning to
local managers to either run their offices on their
behalf or act as subcontractors; but the policy is still
designed, funded and steered by the international
NGOs).
- The refocusing of activities onto the fight against
child malnutrition accompanied by a reduction in
the scope of free healthcare along national policy
lines (with only anti-malarial drugs and RDTs
remaining free of charge).
This case spells out the difficulties of the local long-
term continuation of the support provided by an NGO.
Far from simply handing over responsibility to the dis-
trict and, hence, to the Malian health system as planned,
the NGO has been forced to continue with its support,
but in a different format involving the scaling down its
ambitions. This is part of a wider phenomenon encoun-
tered right across the development aid spectrum: the
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support delivered by international NGOs is increasingly
outsourced to local NGOs.
To the extent that it enables national managers to be
trained and employed, this recent trend is to be wel-
comed. However, the system only exists because the
national NGO is supported by its international counter-
part. The local health centres that benefit from this aid
continue to enjoy a privileged status (that of being run
by an NGO) compared to health centres run by the
state. However, dependence on outside help continues.
This does not, therefore, solve the problem of long-term
sustainability at local level, in other words weaning dis-
tricts and health centres off outside support and re-
incorporating them into the ‘normal’ state system.
The question as to whether the support given by inter-
national NGOs to districts and local health centres in
order to widen access to free healthcare gradually leads
to weaning, or whether it has the completely opposite
effect of triggering an addiction to aid is one that is
worth raising. The same question applies, moreover,
above and beyond free healthcare - and even health itself
- to all forms of local development, i.e. direct support
that is provided by outside partners to local organizations
and institutions via a ‘micro-project’ type programme or
via ‘civil society organizations’ acting as sub-contractors.
The extension of the support in a new format was also
the option in Niger, however this time it was set up dif-
ferently and was more the result of chance than a deci-
sion by the NGO involved or the district it supported. It
was the UNFPA that took over from MDM, not as a con-
scious choice but because its policy of promoting free
deliveries in Niger prompted it to choose a health region
that included the district of Keita where MDM had devel-
oped its pilot experiment of free deliveries. In this parti-
cular case, a change of scale (the UNFPA supported free
deliveries in four different regions) and of institution was
involved: the assistance was now provided by an interna-
tional organization from within the United Nations sys-
tem and not by an NGO.
Nonetheless, this case enables the comparison of two
very different types of intervention that could be
described as ‘localized support’ and ‘mass assistance’.
1. NGOs such as TDH, MSF-B and MDM offer loca-
lized support over a limited area (at district level) with
expatriate staff already on the ground and national staff
recruited for the purpose. Localized support of this nat-
ure makes for greater flexibility, better collaboration with
health workers and districts and greater responsiveness;
it can also result in local norms being taken into account
(for example, the remuneration of birth attendants has
been tolerated in Keita despite the fact that the NGO
promotes free deliveries). However, it has its limitations:
there are times when the decisions of the assisting NGO
are at odds with local opinion. In Kangaba, for example,
workers and local politicians were very resistant to the
extension of free healthcare brought in by MSF; however,
their opposition was not expressed openly in case it dis-
couraged outside support, from which both these groups
benefited: this is another illustration of the contrast
between what is said in public (governed by the strategy
of “saying the right thing”) and what is said in private
(information gathered through qualitative surveys): see in
this issue Olivier de Sardan. In a similar fashion, the
views of local health workers have not always been con-
sidered in Keita where reimbursements by MdM for nor-
mal deliveries were considered inadequate. Workers in
Tougan felt they were being underpaid by TDH.
2. Intervention by the UNFPA, on the other hand, is on
a large scale, and largely confined to the funding of free
deliveries and the institutional procedures for achieving
this objective. ‘Mass assistance’ is bureaucratic in nature,
and does not offer the close supervision ensured by the
local support that NGOs provide. In fact, the same pro-
blems often arise through UNFPA funding as through
funding by the state: delays in the reimbursement of
costs and the inadequacy and unsuitability of medical
packs have been recorded since the UNFPA took over
from MDM.
Scaling up
With the UNFPA, the second dimension of long-term
sustainability emerges on a real-life scale, i.e. that of scal-
ing up, in the sense of generalizing the local experiment
to the entire country. Whereas local sustainability is all
about breaking dependency (or “discontinuing the infu-
sion”), the generalization of a pilot experiment necessarily
involves its insertion into a bureaucratic machine of sub-
stantial proportions and, therefore, the designing and
implementation of a national mechanism that brings the
entire health system into play with its multiple levels, all
of which are potential bottlenecks: e.g. funding from
above, reimbursement procedures, procurement of
inputs, logistics, health workers commitment, interaction
with users, informing the public, inspection, supervision
and monitoring, etc.
The transition from a local experiment receiving local
support to a national policy on a massive scale therefore
involves much more than political determination or the
existence of an adequate budget. These two necessary
conditions are often stressed in the literature on public
policy-making [29-34]. However, they are not always
found together: indeed, far from it, as free healthcare
policies have shown. However, there is also a third condi-
tion, which is no more likely to feature than the other
two: a health system that is sufficiently effective in its
operation to be able to implement this scaling up in a
satisfactory manner, without any major adverse effects.
The day-to-day functioning of the health system (and of
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the national health bureaucracy) is, therefore, a strategic
variable. In their present form, the health systems of Bur-
kina Faso, Mali and Niger are totally incapable of provid-
ing the same kind of training and supervision to health
centres on a national scale as NGOs do at a local level.
Moreover, they are often to blame for numerous
blockages, again as demonstrated by free healthcare. It is
part of a more general issue: “Much of the evidence about
what works, however, comes from projects undertaken on
a small scale in controlled environments where funding
and technical assistance have been sufficient,” [35].
What all this means is that there are many aspects to
“scaling up”. In this issue, Valéry Ridde looks at one aspect
that concerns “policy-makers”, in particular: before pro-
moting a new public policy, do the authorities or interna-
tional organizations take account or otherwise of the ‘pilot
experiments’ (usually initiated by NGOs) already underta-
ken in the matter, and, particularly, of the lessons that can
be learnt through the research carried out on the subject?
The answer is ‘no’, and it becomes part of the debate on
the very possibility of “evidence-based policy making.” In
this respect, Sanderson [36] tries to steer an interesting
middle way between a naïve positivism that imagines pub-
lic policy-making to be enlightened by science and the
post-modernist rejection of the idea that reason plays any
part in determining public policies.
Other aspects are regularly broached by studies dealing
with these problems, which, in reality, comprise two sub-
sets or two points of entry: the literature on sustainability
[37-40] and the literature that deals with “scaling up”
[41-43]. Both kinds are essentially normative. They seek
to provide a complete list of the variables that might
enable (or, conversely, compromise) a policy of sustain-
ability/scaling up, and they try adding them together or
arranging them in a variety of frameworks. The health
systems of the high and middle income countries are, for
the most part, their referents, and their building blocks
have been transposed to countries in the low income
countries. The many problems (various facets of which
are described in this issue) posed by the malfunctioning
of national health bureaucracies, the incoherent manage-
ment of human resources within the health system and
the inappropriate behaviour of health workers certainly
get a mention from time to time, but this tends to be
oblique and expressed euphemistically, without too much
emphasis being placed on these issues. For example, Sim-
mons & Shiffman [44] mention the need for a “major
change in bureaucratic culture”, but say nothing about
the empirical content of this bureaucratic culture. While
the knowledge gap concerning the daily functioning
of African bureaucratic cultures have been tackled
recently [45,46], it has not been so much the case in the
health domain (the analysis of organisational issues being
nevertheless a first step forward [47,48]). This question
constitutes a major challenge for any scaling up of a local
experiment and for any public policies relating to health
in general.
From this point of view, the fact that the pilot experi-
ments on free healthcare have been conducted under an
NGO makes them irrelevant to the scaling up process.
Only experiments carried out under the “ordinary” man-
agement of the state are capable of laying bare the pro-
blems associated with this process. Of course it does not
mean that an experiment undertaken by the state (and in
fact there are very few) will automatically be considered,
evaluated and scaled up, far from that. A general observa-
tion made by Simmons & Shiffman applies rather well to
NGO experiments: “When pilot or experimental projects
are tested in social and managerial environments that dif-
fer greatly from the setting into which they are to be trans-
ferred, a second research phase may be called for in which
the innovations are validated in more typical programma-
tic contexts” [49].
As we have stressed, a local NGO providing assistance
locally does not only give financial support, it also gives
different kinds of human support which come from out-
side: e.g. behavioural models, technical supervision, train-
ing, supervision and monitoring, leadership, staff
management, management of flows and inputs, account-
ing, etc.
In the context of a potential policy of scaling up these
experiments, it is certainly possible with a good dose of
optimism to envisage national or international funding
being found, in other words, the financial support
enjoyed by an NGO-assisted district for implementing a
local policy of fee exemption being generalized to the
national level. African states such as Burkina Faso, Mali
and Niger would perhaps have the means to fund fee
exemptions from their budgets if a real political will
existed and if other budget choices were exercised. But
on the other hand, in the current circumstances, it is
completely impossible for the human support provided
externally by the NGO to be generalized as well. Indeed,
with all their inconsistencies, the constraints that bind
them, their practical norms, limitations, shortcomings
and contradictions, it is the current human resources in
the health system that will have to scale up a new
policy.
It is precisely the management of human resources (in
its widest sense, a sense which goes beyond plain “man-
agement”) that constitutes one of the main bottlenecks in
health systems in Africa, and this is one of the main rea-
sons why they are so dysfunctional. If sustainability is
defined as the “organizational routinization” of the beha-
viour learnt or modified during the pilot experiment
[38,49], this dreamt-of or imagined routinization comes
up against the all-too-real current routines and red tape
that characterize the health system, especially the practical
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norms that govern the behaviour of the actors. In circum-
stances like these, it is no longer a matter of hoping for or
stimulating the political will of those at the top to imple-
ment exemption policies, but of undertaking a complete
overhaul of the health system and health bureaucracy.
Conclusion
There is an obvious difference between projects on paper,
designed in American or European institutions by inter-
national experts - who are, without doubt, competent in
their fields and whose goodwill can hardly be called into
question - and projects on the ground in Africa, which
come up against the stubborn fact that local and national
contexts are nothing like the standard model that has
been used as the basis for these projects. This is what has
been called the “capability trap": “This capability trap
emerges under specific conditions which yield interven-
tions that (a) aim to reproduce particular external condi-
tions considered ‘best practice’ in dominant agendas, (b)
through pre-determined linear processes, (c) that inform
tight monitoring of inputs and compliance to ‘the plan’,
and (d) are driven from the top down, assuming that
implementation largely happens by edict” [50].
In the case of the NGOs that have supported locally
free healthcare and which, during the time of their invol-
vement, have produced results in the locality that are
often spectacular and always highly valued by the local
people, the ultimate goal of sustainability appears well
beyond reach, and for one basic reason, over which these
NGOs have no control: the present state of the national
health systems of the three countries in question with
their financial and human shortcomings. A local sustain-
ability strategy, and even more so a national one, that
takes no account of the real state of health bureaucracies
and, at the same time, does not attempt to reform them,
has little chance of success. This is yet another argument
for conducting pilot experiments in health centres run by
the state rather than an NGO. However, this hope
obviously implies that those within the present health
system show a willingness to innovate and experiment at
different levels leading to outcomes that can be put into
practice. Hence there is a need to find and support local
reformers. Without reformers ‘on the inside’ [51-53]
(within the health system itself and among health work-
ers), no real reform of the health system can succeed. It
is not even inconceivable that an unexpected but positive
effect of an NGO presence would be to encourage or
support reformers on the inside.
However, this is not at the heart of official NGO agen-
das. Instead of starting from a documented analysis of
the real capacities of the health systems in Burkina Faso,
Mali and Niger as they exist at present (an analysis con-
sisting of a diagnosis of their day-to-day functioning, the
practical norms of health workers and their likely
capacity for adapting to change in a credible and realis-
tic way) or from attempts to find local innovators and
reformers, NGO support projects take their own objec-
tives and means of achieving them as their starting
point. They then apply these to the perceived needs of
the local population (in the present case, its health
needs) with a view to initiating a local action that is
supposed to set an example. This is an illustration of
the famous “garbage can” model [54], on which Naudet
has drawn for his analysis of the world of development
[55]: the trick is to look for problems to fit the solutions
which are already available and which one is keen to
promote. The outcome appears to be more or less the
same in every case. The action is a success locally
(within the short timescale of intervention) but its sus-
tainability at local level, and even more so at national
level, is a failure (in terms of the much longer timescale
of the health system).
As the case studies in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger
have shown, any innovation introduced into the health
system should entail a realistic and unadorned under-
standing of the day-to-day operation of the current sys-
tem at the locations earmarked for the innovation in
question.
Or, to put it another way: any scaling up as well as
any new health policy that does not at the same time
include a reform of the health bureaucracies and the
practices reaching down into what happens routinely
appears be doomed to sustainability failure.
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